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 The effect of board size and composition on bank efficiency 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the relationship between board structure, in terms of board size 
and composition, and bank performance. Unlike previous studies, the present analysis 
is carried out within a stochastic frontier framework. To this end, bank performance is 
proxied by both cost and profit efficiency, measures that present considerable 
advantages over simple accounting ratios. The empirical framework formed is applied 
to a panel of large European banks operating during the period 2002-2006. We find 
that board size negatively affects banks’ cost and profit efficiency, while the impact of 
board composition on profit efficiency is non-linear. Finally, introducing risk-taking 
(credit risk) as an interaction component of board size and composition does not affect 
the robustness of the results.     
 
JEL classification: G21; G34; C23; K23 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board size and composition; Bank cost and profit 
efficiency; Stochastic frontier analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
Banks’ multifaceted and pivotal role in the economic system has attracted, not without 
valid reasons, much regulatory attention in an effort to inspire sound corporate 
governance standards and address the unique features of and risks faced by credit 
institutions. The size and composition of the board of directors constitute of the most 
essential corporate governance themes and have caught the attention of academics and 
regulators alike. The latter, in particular, appear remarkably confident that smaller and 
more outsider-dominated boards are critical drivers of better corporate management 
and, thus, contribute positively to corporate performance. The present study innovates 
in that the board structure (in terms of board size and composition)–performance 
relationship in banking is examined within a stochastic frontier framework, while 
performance is measured in terms of cost and profit efficiency of banks. This places 
the present paper within the large literature that analyzes bank performance using 
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frontier methodologies (for reviews see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Hughes and 
Mester, 2008).  
According to the generic definition offered by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, corporate governance involves a set of relationships 
between corporate management, the board of directors, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, while also providing the structure through which corporate objectives 
are set, and the means of accomplishing those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined (OECD, 2004). Essentially, by establishing internal mechanisms 
inciting corporate management to promote company’s interests and facilitating 
effective monitoring, corporate governance systems enhance investors’ protection and 
confidence, thus contributing to the proper functioning of the market economy and the 
improvement of economic efficiency and growth (OECD, 2004; Basel Committee, 
2006). Upgrading corporate board structure, in terms of both size and composition, 
has been one of the core themes in all corporate governance initiatives undertaken by 
international fora (e.g., EU Commission Communication, 2003; OECD, 2004; Basel 
Committee, 2006). 
Despite this renowned interest in the role of board size and composition, a full 
review of the relevant literature concerning the impact of board structure on banks’ 
performance reveals that empirical findings are mixed. A common element of these 
studies is that bank performance is proxied by simple accounting ratios that have been 
proved limited measures of bank performance. Phrased differently, the empirical 
studies on the board structure-bank performance relationship have not embraced the 
large literature on the measurement of bank performance using stochastic frontier 
methods. This seems odd because most bank performance studies have reached 
consensus that frontier efficiency measures are superior for most regulatory and other 
purposes to the standard financial ratios from accounting statements, which are 
commonly employed by regulators, financial institution managers and industry 
consultants to assess performance. The main reasoning is that frontier measures use 
statistical techniques that remove the effects of differences in prices and other 
exogenous market factors affecting the standard performance ratios and, therefore, 
they are capable of characterizing the underlying production relationship (e.g., Fried, 
Lovell and Schmidt, 1993; Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998). 
In the context of present analysis, the above consideration has at least three 
implications that justify analyzing the impact of board size and composition on bank 
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performance within a frontier efficiency framework. First, financial ratios such as the 
return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) suffer from the well-known 
conceptual shortcomings relating to the evaluation of inventories and depreciation 
(Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Pi and Timme, 1993; Destefanis and Sena, 2007). To a 
different extent among banks, these ratios under-represent a bank’s value because of 
the so-called investment myopia problem (that is, when executives overextend the 
useful life of their assets and delay needed new investments). If executives indulge in 
myopic behavior, longer-term investment decreases and frontier efficiency is capable 
of capturing this effect, since inventories and depreciation are accounted for in the 
production relationship. Furthermore, corporate governance theory on separation 
between management and ownership implies that executives may have incentives to 
undertake projects yielding increased bargaining power, which may not be associated 
with increased productivity or profitability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Again this 
behavior will be immediately reflected in the efficiency indicator, while measures of 
performance like the Tobin’s Q may remain in higher levels in the short-run. Finally, 
and as regards Tobin’s Q, if market efficiency deviates from the standards of the 
Anglo-Saxon markets and/or many banks trade their equity in thin, secondary 
markets, assessment of the market value of assets (needed to construct Q) is either 
misleading or not readily available (Destefanis and Sena, 2007; Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou, 2007). The above arguments imply that a study of the relationship between 
board structure and bank performance within a stochastic frontier framework is 
worthwhile, as it may shed some light on the diverse character of the findings in the 
relevant literature. 
Two final distinguishing characteristics of this study are worth noting. First, 
advances in stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which is the method used in the 
present paper, allow controlling for a number of bank-level and industry determinants 
of bank efficiency. In particular, and given the fact that the choice on the size and 
composition of bank boards may be made on the basis of better risk management, we 
are very much interested to control for credit risk when evaluating the impact of board 
size and composition on bank performance. In addition, we augment the usual 
stochastic frontier methods to account for the possible endogeneity between bank 
performance, board structure and risk, which is an issue of significant debate in the 
recent literature. 
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 The present study comprises five sections. The following section demarcates 
the general framework of the debate by providing a concise theoretical basis of the 
increased regulatory and academic interest on banks’ corporate governance systems, 
while also reviewing the relevant literature concerning the relationship between board 
structure (i.e., board size and composition) and bank performance. The third section 
explains the empirical model and discusses the dataset used in the present study. The 
study proceeds with the empirical results and relates them to the different strands of 
the literature. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Corporate governance and banks: Setting the discussion in context  
2.1. Rationalizing the regulatory emphasis upon banks’ corporate governance  
The comparatively heavy regulation of the banking industry has conventionally been 
attributed to the multifaceted and, by extension, sensitive role that banks perform in 
the economic system as liquidity guarantors, originators of non-market finance, 
information brokers between lenders and borrowers and payment system operators 
(for an overview of the special functions performed by banks and the relevant literature 
see inter alia Gorton and Winton, 2003 and references therein). Effectively, however, the 
essential of banking, i.e., the transformation of short-term, payable-on-demand 
deposits into illiquid, long-term loans, coupled with asymmetric information on the 
quality of the inherently opaque bank assets and the application of the ‘first-come, 
first-served’ rule permeating deposit withdrawals renders credit institutions 
particularly susceptible to runs by their depositors. To make things worst, the failure 
of an individual bank may spill-over to other banks, either via inter-bank linkages 
with the ailing bank or because of panic provoking bank runs on other, non-distressed 
banks, thus destabilizing the economic system as a whole (for an overview of the 
theories and literature on bank runs and contagion risk see, inter alia, Calomiris, 2007 and 
references therein). 
Special, public safety-nets in the form of deposit insurance and liquidity 
injection by the central bank in times of crises (lender-of-last-resort operation) 
underlines the ‘special’ role of banks in the economy and manifests the weight that 
regulators attach in maintaining public confidence in the smooth operation of the 
banking system. On the other hand, however, public guarantees engender moral 
hazard as they erode depositors’ incentives to monitor credit institutions, while, at the 
same time, encourage increased risk-taking by banks.1 Phrased differently, the special 
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character of banks appears to inspire a ‘regulatory cycle’: banks’ distinctive functions 
call for equally special regulatory attention, which, however, stimulates unique moral 
hazard risks necessitating, in turn, a new layer of regulation (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993; Ceccheti, 1999). Internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., 
appointing non-executive, independent directors, introducing internal control systems, 
establishing board committees, monitoring directors’ remuneration) present 
themselves as one of the most popular devices to discipline corporate management 
and curtail banks’ increased risk-taking appetite.2 Moreover, prudently run banks 
produce positive externalities in the sense that they induce efficient corporate 
governance of the firms with which they are associated either as creditors or, most 
importantly, as shareholders (Barth, Caprio and Nolle, 2004). 
Indeed, the Basel Committee (2006) has explicitly recognized that the 
important financial intermediation role of banks, their sensitivity to failures stemming 
from inefficient corporate management and the need to safeguard and align the (often 
conflicting) interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, including supervisors, 
governments and depositors, render banks’ corporate governance of great importance 
to the financial system.3 Drawing from international experience, the Basel Committee 
(2006) underlines, in particular, the key role of the board of directors and senior 
management for the safety and soundness of banks, placing, inter alia, emphasis on 
the board structure (including size) that “promotes efficiency and real strategic 
discussion” as well as on the appointment of an adequate number of directors 
“capable of exercising independent judgment of the views of management, political 
interests or inappropriate outside interests”. 
In a similar vein, John and Senbet (1998) corroborate the prominent position 
that board structure and organization occupy in the corporate governance discussion, 
concluding that the board of director’s effectiveness in monitoring corporate 
management is fundamentally determined by its independence and size. Nevertheless, 
as already noticed, notwithstanding the ‘popularity’ of the particular corporate 
governance field, empirical research regarding the effect of board structure (i.e., board 
size and composition) upon bank performance is not only comparatively scarce but, 
most importantly, has failed to reach consensus. 
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2.2. Board size and bank performance 
Simpson and Gleason (1999) elaborated upon a sample consisting of those banking 
firms listed in the SNL Quarterly Bank Digest 1993 and found that the number of 
board directors did not have a significant bearing on the probability of banks’ 
financial distress. Adams and Mehran (2005) examined the relation between board 
size and firm performance using a sample of 35 large publicly-traded US bank 
holding companies (BHCs) during 1959-1999. Contrary to the evidence for non-
financial firms, they concluded that banking firms with larger boards do not under-
perform their peers in terms of Tobin’s Q and that, as a result, constraints on board 
size in the banking industry may be counter-productive. On the same line, Belkhir 
(2006) studied a sample of 260 US bank and savings-and-loan holding companies for 
2002, inferring that internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., manager and 
block-holder ownership, proportion of outside directors, CEO-Chairman duality, 
board size) are, to a considerable degree, endogenously determined and they exert a 
non-significant impact upon banks’ performance. 
Likewise, Zulkafli and Samad (2007) analyzed a sample of 107 listed banks in 
the nine countries of Asian emerging markets (Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India), also deducing that board 
size is not significantly correlated with performance measures, such as the Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. Finally, in their updated version of the 2005 research, Adams and Mehran 
(2008) used a sample of 35 large publicly traded BHCs over the period 1959-1999 
and concluded that board size does not have a negative effect on performance.  
More recently, Andres and Vallelado (2008) examined information on the 
characteristics of the boards of directors for 69 commercial banks operating in 
Canada, US, UK, Spain, France and Italy over the period 1995-2005. After controlling 
for the ownership structure, the weight of the banking industry, or differences in the 
regulatory and institutional setting, they found that the inclusion of more directors is 
positively associated with performance, which is measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and 
shareholder market return (SMR). However, they added that beyond a certain limit 
(i.e., 19 directors) the coordination, control and decision-making problems 
encountered by larger boards offset the benefits.  
On the other hand and using a somewhat different approach, Sierra, Talmor 
and Wallace (2006) constructed a board strength index on the basis of 76 bank 
holding companies (BHCs) that operated during the period 1992-1997. The index 
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consisted of seven variables, including board size and independence under the 
assumption that larger and more insider-dominated boards are associated with less 
monitoring and higher CEO compensation and that, as such, denote weaker boards. 
Their findings indicated that stronger boards (i.e., BHCs with a higher score on the 
index) display higher performance measured in terms of ROA. The work of 
Staikouras, Staikouras and Agoraki (2007) examined a sample of 58 out of the 100 
largest, in terms of total assets, credit institutions operating in Europe for the period 
between 2002 and 2004. Their analysis inferred that bank profitability – measured in 
terms of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q – is negatively and significantly related to the size 
of the Board of Directors. Finally, Pathan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2007) using 
a dataset of the Thai commercial banks over the period 1999-2003, also obtained a 
negative relation between board size and both ROE and ROA.  
 
2.3. Board composition and bank performance  
The same puzzling picture is attained when empirically assessing the relationship 
between board composition and bank performance. A string of literature inferred that 
the proportion of directors maintaining an employment relationship with the bank 
(inside directors) and all other directors (outside directors) does not have a significant 
impact upon bank performance as measured in terms of Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE (Pi 
and Timme, 1993; Adams and Mehran, 2005, 2008; Belkhir, 2006). Staikouras et al. 
(2007) reached the same conclusion after examining the effect of the executive and 
non-executive directors’ ratio upon bank performance. In the particular study, 
“directors that are currently employed by the firm, retired employees of the firm, 
related company officers or immediate family members of firm employees are 
classified as executives”, while “[n]on-executive directors are members of the Board 
who are not top executives, retired executives, former executives, relatives of the 
CEO or the chairperson of the Board, or outside corporate lawyers employed by the 
firm”. On the same line, Simpson and Gleason (1999) found that enhancing the 
participation of inside directors (i.e., corporate officers also serving as board 
directors) does not have a bearing on the banks’ probability to become financial 
distressed, while Griffith, Fogelberg and Weeks (2002) also concluded that banks’ 
performance, measured in terms of market value added (MVA), economic value 
added (EVA) and Tobin’s Q, is not significantly influenced by the number of inside 
directors (i.e., officers, ex-employees, persons related to an officer of the bank). 
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Finally, the more recent work of Andres and Vallelado (2008) found an inverted U-
shaped relation between the proportion of outsiders, defined as the number of non-
executive directors, and bank performance, suggesting that an optimum combination 
of executive and non-executive directors would be more effective in securing value 
for banks than excessively independent boards. 
In contrast, Sierra et al. (2006), after denoting inside directors as the number 
of executive directors and associating their presence with less board independence and 
accountability, concluded that a positive correlation subsists between stronger boards 
(i.e., BHCs with a higher value for a composite board index also comprising board 
independence and accountability) and performance measured in terms of ROA. The 
research of Busta (2007) examined a sample of 69 listed banks from France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and UK over the period 1996-2005 and a sample of 125 banks 
operating in EU-15 and Switzerland during 2004. The results from the first sample 
indicated that banks with a higher presence of non-executives (i.e., independent 
directors) in their boards perform better in terms of the market-to-book value and 
return on invested capital (ROIC) as far as the Continental Europe is concerned, while 
the opposite holds for the UK; no significant correlation was detected in terms of 
ROA. On the same line, Pathan et al. (2007) reached the conclusion that more board 
independence, determined as the number of outside/non-executive directors 
maintaining no material (employment or shareholding) relationship with the firm, is 
associated with better performance of Thai banks, implying that independent directors 
improve board accountability. 
 
2.4. Bank efficiency and corporate governance: New paths for exploration 
The empirical literature on bank efficiency and corporate governance parameters is 
outstandingly meager and is completely absent (to the best of our knowledge) when 
the broader measure of profit efficiency is considered. Pi and Timme (1993) 
employed, for the first time, not only ROA but also cost efficiency (derived from a 
stochastic frontier cost model) as a performance measure, arguing that cost efficiency 
is negatively related to the combination of the Chairman and CEO roles and unrelated 
both to institutional and large ownership, as well as to the proportion of outside and 
inside board directors. Unfortunately, this early paper has not taken full benefit from 
the relatively recent econometric advances on stochastic frontiers and in particular of 
the consistent modeling of the determinants of bank efficiency. Finally, pursuing the 
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same issue, Tanna, Pasiouras and Nnadi  (2008) used a sample of 18 banks operating 
in the UK between 2001 and 2006 and a combination of data envelopment analysis 
with Tobit regressions to estimate the technical, allocative and cost efficiency in the 
first stage and then identify potential correlates of efficiency. They found some 
evidence that board size is related to efficiency noticing, however, that this impact is 
not robust across different samples and specifications, while, at the same time, they 
concluded that a higher proportion of non-executive directors has a robustly positive 
and significant impact on all measures of efficiency.  However, this two-stage 
approach applied in the study, is subject to severe consistency problems (see 
Brissimis, Delis and Papanikolaou, 2008). 
 
2.5. Endogeneity issues 
A relatively more recent line of literature has been attempting to establish a relation 
between board size and composition, on the one hand, and firm characteristics, on the 
other hand, based upon the costs and benefits of the board’s monitoring and advising 
roles (see e.g., Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2008; Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen, 2008). The main thrust of this literature is that each firm 
structures the board in a way that promotes its own future value, thus offering a 
plausible explanation for the future size and composition of the board (for a thorough 
discussion, see also Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). As a result, a causal relationship 
between board variables and firm performance when the former are assessed as 
exogenous should be approached with cautiousness. Given this potential endogeneity, 
it would appear that modeling board composition in the fashion of most of the 
previous literature may not be appropriate (see also Garay and Gonzalez, 2008). 
Therefore, besides using a stochastic frontier approach to proxy bank performance, we 
also opt for augmenting the estimation technique to account for the aforementioned 
potential endogeneity.  
 
3. Empirical specification and data  
3.1. Methodology 
To provide a comprehensive analysis of bank efficiency we estimate both cost and 
profit efficiency, using the so-called stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). More 
specifically, we build on the model put forth by Battese and Coelli (1995), as their 
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framework permits the simultaneous estimation of the profit or cost frontier with the 
equations including the determinants of efficiency. 
Cost efficiency is defined as the deviation of a bank’s actual cost from the 
best-practice in the industry. Thus, the cost efficiency ratio measures the proportion of 
cost or resources that are used efficiently by the bank. The general Battese and Coelli 
model specifies a cost frontier with the following properties: 
ln ( , )it it it it itTC f W Y v u= + +
)
                                                                                                       (1) 
where TCit denotes observed operating and financial cost for bank i at year t (in 
logarithmic terms), Wit is a vector of input prices and Yit is a vector of outputs of the 
bank. The error term is distinguished in two components: vit corresponds to the 
random fluctuations, is assumed to follow a symmetric normal distribution around the 
frontier ( 2~ (0,it vv iidN σ ) and captures a phenomenon beyond the control of 
management; uit, accounts for the bank’s inefficiency, which can be controlled by 
management and is assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution of the form 
2~ ( , )it it uu N m σ . The SFA approach assumes that the inefficiency component of the 
error term is positive; that is, higher bank inefficiency is associated with higher cost. 
For the estimation of the cost function, we follow the literature (see e.g., Lensink, 
Meesters and Naaborg, 2007) in using the following translog specification: 
0
2
ln( ) ln ln 1/ 2 ln ln 1/ 2 ln ln
ln ln
it i it j jt im it mt jk jt kt
i j i m j k
ij it jt it it
i j
TC a a W Y a W W Y Y
W Y D T T v u
β β
δ λ κ κ
= + + + + +
′+ + + + + +
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑ (2) 
The standard symmetry restrictions are imposed, i.e., im mia a= ; jkβ kjβ=  (see also Berger 
and Mester, 1997). Note that in the above specification we include both country 
dummy variables (D) and a time trend (T) in the estimation of the frontier. Since a 
translog function is a second order approximation, a squared term of the trend is also 
included. 
Contrary to the concept of cost efficiency, profit efficiency captures both the 
cost and revenue dimension of bank operation and therefore accounts for inefficiency 
originating both in the input and output side (Berger, Hancock and Humphrey, 1993). 
In other words, profit efficiency is a broader measure of bank performance that 
identifies how close a bank is to producing the maximum possible profit, given a 
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particular level of input and output prices (Berger and Humprey, 1997). The profit 
function of a bank takes the following general form:  
( , )it it it it itf W Y v u′ ′Π = + +                                                                                               (3) 
where Πit is total profit of bank i in period t, and the error terms (inefficiency and 
remainder disturbance) follow the same assumptions as above. Note that we employ 
an alternative profit function in which each bank maximizes profits given output 
quantities, rather than taking output prices as exogenous (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). In most cases the alternative profit function has provided qualitatively similar 
results with a standard profit function; however, the alternative profit function can be 
employed when output price data is missing (for further discussion on this issue, see 
Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997 and references therein). 
Similarly to the case of the cost function, we specify a translog profit function 
of the following form: 
0
2
ln( 1) ln ln 1/2 ln ln 1/2 ln ln
ln ln
it i it j jt im it mt jk jt kt
i j i m j k
ij it jt it it
i j
a a W Y a W W Y Y
W Y D T T v u
θ β β
δ λ κ κ
Π + + = + + + + +
′+ + + + + −
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑  (4) 
Notice that, consistent with the profit efficiency literature (see e.g., Berger and 
Mester, 1997), we add a constant θ to the profits of all banks to avoid having 
observations with negative net profits that would render estimation unfeasible.   
In both the cost and profit efficiency models, the mean of the inefficiency term 
m is modeled as a linear function of a set of explanatory variables: 
it i it itm Z wξ= +                                                                   (5) 
where  is assumed to be truncated normally distributed, with zero mean and 
variance 
itw
2
uσ , ξ  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and Z is a vector of bank-
specific and country-level factors that affect efficiency, including the proxies for the 
governance variables. Finally, in the previous section, we observed a number of 
reasons explaining that the endogeneity problem of the governance variables is quite 
relevant and should be dealt with in our empirical framework. A simple way to come 
around this issue is to follow the transformation of Bhargava (1991). In our empirical 
model this transformation implies separating the Z-variables into a class of exogenous 
variables and a class of endogenous variables. In other words, it is assumed that the 
variables characterizing the board structure and all the other bank-level Z-variables 
are correlated with v in some general way. The country-specific control variables 
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(given below) serve as exogenous variables. In this framework, a third equation is 
estimated simultaneously with Eqs. (2 or 4) and (5), which involves regressing the 
endogenous variable on the exogenous variables. In particular, this third equation 
takes the form –Z2+ξ1Z1=w2, where Z2 and Z1 are the endogenous and exogenous 
classes of variables, respectively. The emerging system can be estimated using full 
information maximum likelihood, under the assumption of normal standard errors.4 
For a proof of the consistency of this system estimator, see Bhargava (1991). 
 
3.2. Data 
Having defined the methodological approach to be followed, we focus on the 
selection of variables. We construct a balanced sample of 57 large European 
commercial banks operating in the EU-12 countries over the period 2002-2006. These 
banks were amongst the 100 largest (in terms of book value of assets) banks during 
the period examined.5 All data were manually collected from bank accounts and 
annual reports. The availability of panel data permits us to check the response 
processes over time and to identify how the changing characteristics of the board 
affect bank efficiency.  
The first problem encountered in evaluating bank efficiency is the definition 
and measurement of bank output. The two most widely used approaches are the 
‘production’ and the ‘intermediation’ approaches (for details, see Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). While we acknowledge that it would probably be best to employ 
both approaches to identify whether the results are biased when using a different set 
of outputs, transaction level data needed to employ the production approach is 
typically unavailable on a bank-by-bank basis. Hence, our study opts for the 
intermediation approach. Accordingly, we specify three outputs, namely, total loans, 
total securities and off-balance sheet items; and three inputs, i.e., interest expenses, 
personnel expenses and total other expenses. The three input prices are constructed by 
dividing (i) interest expenses by total deposits and short-term funding, (ii) personnel 
expenses by total assets6 and (iii) overheads by total fixed assets (a similar approach 
has been adopted by many other studies, including, for example, Altunbas, Gardener, 
Molyneux and Moore, 2001).  In order to guarantee linear homogeneity we scale total 
costs and inputs prices by the price of labor. 
The elements Z of main interest in the present study are the measures of board 
size and composition, comprising the so-called board structure factor. Following the 
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corporate governance literature (e.g., Yermack, 1996), we define board size as the 
natural logarithm of the number of directors. However, as bank size exhibits a positive 
correlation with board size, we also develop an alternative measure to check the 
robustness of our results by dividing the board size variable by the natural logarithm 
of total assets (see also Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004). This allows us to avoid the 
critique that large banks, which naturally face more complex organizational 
structures, are in need of larger boards.  
Turning our attention to the board composition measure, several caveats 
should be placed in order. To begin with, as a proxy for board composition we use the 
ratio of non-executive directors over the total number of directors. Definitions of who 
qualifies as ‘executive’ and ‘non-executive’ director vary across legal systems. 
Nevertheless, a common and generally acceptable denominator could be traced in the 
EU Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, defining an ‘executive director’ as 
any member of the administrative body (unitary board) who is engaged in the daily 
management of the company, and a ‘non-executive director’ as any member of the 
administrative body (unitary board) of a company other than an executive director. 
The fundamental role of non-executive directors evolves around overseeing executive 
and managing directors while also dealing with situations involving conflicts of 
interests (OECD, 2004; EU Commission Recommendation, 2005/162/EC). With 
respect to banks that adopt the ‘two-tier’ (or dual) board system, the assumption made 
is that the directors that belong to the supervisory board (i.e., supervisory directors) 
are non-executives. This is absolutely consistent both with the relevant definitions 
offered by the EU Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, the OECD 2004 
Corporate Governance Principles and the 2006 Basel Committee Corporate 
Governance Principles using the two terms interchangeably and delineating non-
executive and supervisory directors’ tasks in an identical manner, as well as with the 
relevant literature (e.g., Van Greuning and  Brajovic-Bratanovic, 2003; Busta 2007). 
Second, as already evidenced by the relevant literature review, empirical 
research tends to approach the board composition measure from varying angles, 
which, in turn, may add an element of confusion to the ensuing conclusions. More 
specifically, while part of the literature differentiates between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ another part distinguishes between ‘executives’ and ‘non-executives’ and, 
yet, a third portion attempts to separate ‘independent’ from ‘non-independent’ 
directors or even equates ‘non-executives’ with ‘independent’ directors.  Our position 
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is crystal clear: our estimates are based upon the unambiguous dichotomization 
between ‘executive’ and ‘non executive’ directors, as already defined in the previous 
paragraph. Although it is generally considered that board independence is enhanced 
by including non-executive directors (EU Commission Recommendation 
2005/162/EC; Basel Committee, 2006) and that, as a result, the number of non-
executives could be used as a proxy for board independence, we take the position that 
such an approximation is not absolutely robust. For, ‘independent directors’ are not 
one and the same with but constitute a sub-group of non-executive directors, bearing 
distinctive qualitative characteristics typically reflected into national corporate 
governance principles in the form of ‘negative’ criteria (e.g., not be employed by the 
company or its affiliates, not be closely related to the company or its management 
through significant economic, family or other ties, not be representative of or having 
close business ties with dominant shareholders, not be significant creditor or supplier 
of the company, etc.).7 Understandably, the wide divergence of ‘independence 
criteria’ across different jurisdictions in conjunction with the lack of available data on 
the nomination of particular directors as independent does not allow accurate 
estimation of the genuine degree of board independence; hence, we avoid using the 
relevant term preferring, instead, the more pragmatic term ‘board composition’ (see 
also Short, 1996; Sierra at al., 2006; Busta, 2007; Kang, Cheng and Gray, 2007).  
We also use as Z bank-level controls for capitalization and credit risk, so as to 
capture the potential interrelationship between board size and/or composition with 
these basic bank characteristics. Capitalization is measured by the ratio of equity to 
total assets and credit risk by the ratio loan loss provisions to total loans.8 
Furthermore, note that we estimate a common frontier for all banking systems 
in our sample, which enables us to compare the bank-level efficiency estimates across 
countries. To make the global estimation feasible, we employ (as additional Z-
variables) country-specific controls, which include GDP per capita as a proxy for 
differences in the level of economic development, banking market concentration as a 
proxy for banking industry structure, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector 
as a percentage of GDP to control for differences in the development of the financial 
sector and the nominal interest rate as a proxy for the differing monetary conditions 
across countries. Data for the macroeconomic variables are collected from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman (H-H) index (obtained from ECB, 2007).  
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the potential correlates of bank 
efficiency (Zs). As regards the main variables of interest, the board size variable 
ranges between 7 and 48 directors and takes a mean value of 17.15. Board 
composition in terms of non-executive directors’ participation in the board also varies 
widely across banks (from a minimum of 18% to a maximum of 89%) and takes a 
mean value of approximately 61%. The summary statistics are quantitatively similar 
with those reported in previous studies of the banking sector (see e.g., Adams and 
Mehran, 2003; Busta, 2007; Staikouras et al., 2007; Tanna et al., 2008). 
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
 
4. Empirical results  
A number of different versions of the models are estimated and the findings of the 
basic specifications are reported in Table 2. The estimated values for the cost and 
profit efficiency are fairly reasonable. On average, cost efficiency obtains a mean 
value of 89% and profit efficiency stands at 84%.9 Since board size and the 
proportion of non-executive directors are highly correlated variables (the Pearson 
correlation for the variables is as high as 88%), we avoid using them simultaneously 
in the same estimated equations. We further explore two propositions concerning (i) 
the possible non-linearity in the relationships in hand (see Table 3) and (ii) the 
interrelationship between board structure and bank risk-taking (see Table 4). In what 
follows, we discuss these results in turn.10 
A first hint regarding the good fit of our equations is obtained from the 
findings on the effect of control variables on cost and profit efficiency. In particular, 
our results show that GDP per capita has a positive impact on cost and profit 
efficiency in all cases, implying that an increase in GDP lowers total costs. This 
appears intuitive considering that in more prosperous countries banks have better 
access to new technologies (Lensink et al., 2007) or they can offer services of better 
quality. Consistent with the literature suggesting a tradeoff between concentration and 
efficiency (see e.g., Fries and Taci, 2005), the H-H index has a negative and 
significant impact on cost efficiency; however this effect becomes insignificant when 
profit efficiency is considered. Finally, the capital ratio is negatively and significantly 
correlated with cost efficiency and positively correlated with profit efficiency. The 
former result is expected considering that equity capital is an expensive source of 
funding, while the latter result is consistent with the literature advocating that higher 
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capital increases bank revenues and thus counterbalances the increased costs (see e.g., 
Berger, 1995; Brissimis, Delis and Tsionas, 2006). 
Turning to the main focus of our study, our findings seem to be more 
favorably inclined towards the strand of literature suggesting a negative correlation 
between board size and performance (measured in terms of both cost and profit 
efficiency). In fact, this negative impact is further strengthened when scaling board 
size by bank size (see columns II, V of Table 2).11 A number of theoretical arguments 
back up these findings. First, larger boards are usually associated with more intense 
coordination, communication and process problems. In addition, free-rider problems 
become more acute: larger boards not only entail less time for directors in expressing 
their opinions within board meetings but also constrain directors’ incentives to acquire 
information and monitor executive management, which essentially renders them more 
easily controllable by the CEO (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 
1996). Finally, considering that variability constitutes a significant dimension of 
performance, larger boards are related with more compromises to reach consensus 
and, by extension, with less direct and instant decision-making and more modest 
corporate performance (Cheng, 2008).  
The results reflecting a negative correlation between board composition and 
cost efficiency (see column III, Table 2) and an insignificant relationship between 
board composition and profit efficiency (column VI of Table 2) seem to contradict the 
conventional wisdom favoring outsider-dominated boards. In fact, combining 
evidence from the cost and profit efficiency equations and considering that the 
element of revenue is missing from cost equations, it appears that the increased cost 
associated with larger bodies of non-executives is counterbalanced by improved 
revenue for banks with larger proportion of non-executive directors. In other words, 
one may suspect that within the profit efficiency measure, decreased cost efficiency 
and increased revenue efficiency owing to a larger share of non-executives yield the 
non-significant result.  
Another plausible explanation for the absence of a noteworthy association 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance is offered by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) suggesting that it may well be the case that firms 
optimally weigh their boards between insiders and outsiders, in which case it would 
be difficult to trace a relationship between board composition and performance.12 
This argument also appears to be in harmony with our additional tests presented 
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below reporting an inverted U-shaped relationship between board composition and 
profit efficiency. 
(Please insert Table 2 about here) 
In order to inquire into the robustness of the basic results presented in Table 2, 
we estimate a number of alternative regressions. First, we include the square of board 
size to examine the issue of non-linearity, yet no such a pattern is identified in either 
the cost or profit efficiency equations (see columns I, II, IV and V of Table 3). In 
contrast, and as regards profit efficiency, the share of non-executive directors has a 
positive and significant impact, while the coefficient on its squared term is negative 
and significant. Thus, profit efficiency and board composition appear to be related in 
an inverted U-shaped way, which implies that an optimum mix of executives and non-
executives could better promote bank efficiency. This effect, combined with the 
aforementioned finding on the improved revenue efficiency due to the increased 
presence of non-executive directors, seems to underscore the case made by 
supervisory authorities and international fora concerning the, rather neglected, 
advising role of non-executive, independent directors.  
In particular, those non-executive directors that have been nominated as 
independent may have a positive bearing on the quality of corporate decision-making 
and strategy by (a) bringing new perspectives from other businesses, (b) 
constructively challenging and enriching company strategies and introducing 
significant sources of management experience and expertise, and (c) advancing the 
company’s reputation and assisting in the creation of business affiliations (OECD, 
2004; Basel Committee, 2006; UK FRC Combined Code, 2008).13 Nevertheless, it 
should always be born in mind that, in the presence of too many non-executive 
directors, the arguments put forward by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), 
Yermack (1996) and Cheng (2008) concerning oversized boards apply in full: 
nomination of too many non-executives would essentially lead to cumbersome, slack 
and more cost inefficient boards and, by extension, to reduced bank performance. This 
observation elucidates our findings on the non-linear relationship between board 
composition and profit efficiency.   
(Please insert Table 3 about here) 
A significant element in the determination of the optimal board structure in 
banking concerns the risk-taking behavior of banks and in particular credit risk. More 
specifically, it may be that the impact of board size or composition on bank 
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performance is channeled through the better control of credit risk. To examine this 
potential relationship, we add interaction terms of credit risk (measured by loan loss 
provisions/total loans) with the board structure variables. The results, presented in 
Table 4, indicate that large boards are associated with higher loan-loss provisions in 
the cost efficiency equation (see column I), while this effect fades away when profit 
efficiency is considered. Since the latter measure is a more comprehensive reflection 
of bank performance, we conclude that larger board structures are not associated with 
better bank performance through better management of credit risk.14 As regards board 
composition, the results are qualitatively similar with those presented in Table 3, with 
the non-monotonic relationship remaining robust in the profit efficiency equation 
(column VI).15 It is worth mentioning that using the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans does not alter any of these findings. 
(Please insert Table 4 about here) 
 One final concern might be that these results are somehow an artifact of how 
the frontier models were implemented in terms of the variables used to shape the 
frontier. To address this issue we re-estimated the profit efficiency models (which we 
view as the most informative) using: (i) the capital and risk variables only in the 
translog specification (and not as determinants of efficiency), (ii) the macroeconomic 
variables in the translog specification and (iii) the capital, risk and macroeconomic 
variables in both the translog equation and as determinants of efficiency. These 
choices for the modeling of bank efficiency are motivated from the fact that the 
control variables may be thought to have some input characteristics. For example, 
decisions on the level of risk-taking may be internal choices of bank management, the 
capital base may be used to finance expensive projects, while macroeconomic factors, 
if accurately predicted, can influence the production process itself. The results (not 
reported here but available on request) suggest that only the model that includes all 
control variables as both inputs and determinants of efficiency produces somewhat 
different results, especially in connection to the impact of board size (i.e., it becomes 
insignificant). However, this could simply be the effect of multicollinearity or the 
violation of the assumption of independence in the structure of the error term. Bearing 
these issues in mind, we conclude that robust evidence is reported insinuating a 
negative relationship between board size and profit efficiency, as well as an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and profit 
efficiency.    
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 5. Conclusions  
Recent scandals in the financial sector have brought corporate governance at the 
forefront of academic and supervisory attention. Banks’ versatile role in the economic 
system has caught regulatory and supervisory interest around the world in an effort to 
inspire high quality corporate governance standards. Board structure, in the sense of 
board size and composition, and its impact on corporate performance constitutes an 
indispensable and, at the same time, prevalent theme of the corporate governance 
discussion. 
Using a sample of large European banks over 2002-2006, our study innovates 
in that bank performance is measured in terms of both cost and profit efficiency, while 
the impact of board size and composition is modelled within a stochastic frontier 
framework, thus offering a more lucid insight into the sources of efficient 
performance in the banking industry. Our results strongly suggest that, indeed, smaller 
boards are more efficient. On the other hand, the effect of appointing non-executive 
(including independent) directors is not that straightforward. In particular, an 
increased number of non-executive directors decreases cost efficiency, but apparently 
increases revenue efficiency, thus rendering the overall impact on profit efficiency 
questionable. To gain some deeper insights in these patterns we further examine the 
potential non-linearity in the aforementioned relationships. We find that, while the 
negative impact of board size is linear, increasing the number of non-executives is 
negatively associated with banks’ profit efficiency beyond a certain point. Hence, our 
study implies that the regulatory enthusiasm, at least as far as the impact of outsider-
dominated boards is concerned, is not a stated truth and, as a result, should be 
approached with cautiousness. These results, backed up by corporate governance 
theories on both financial and non-financial firms, are robust to controls for bank size, 
risk and capital within a wide array of empirical specifications. 
 
                                                     
 
1 Public guarantees come into operation following the failure of banks. Prudential regulation (e.g., 
capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, constraints on large exposures, standards on the suitability 
and quality of management team and requirements concerning the efficiency of internal control 
systems), on the other hand, operates as an ex ante shield against bank runs and systemic risk. For an 
overview of the relevant literature on public safety nets and moral hazard, see inter alia the theoretical 
part of the papers of Hoggarth, Jackson and Nier (2005), VanHoose (2007), Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and 
Laeven (2008), and references therein. 
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2 The term “internal corporate governance” is employed to distinguish from “external disciplinary 
devices”, including the market for corporate control. In the words of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2006), (internal) corporate governance from a banking industry perspective involves “the 
manner in which the business and affairs of banks are governed by their boards of directors and senior 
management, which affects how they set corporate objectives; operate the bank’s business on a day-to-
day basis; meet the obligation of accountability to their shareholders and take into account the interests 
of other recognised stakeholders; align corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that 
banks will operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; 
and protect the interests of depositors”. 
3 Kose and Yiming (2003), Baxter (2003) and Adams and Mehran (2003) also stress that a distinctive 
corporate governance feature of banks arises from the need to align not only managers’ and equity 
holders’ interests, but also depositors’ interests and the public interest. On the same line, Macey and 
O’Hara (2003) argue that the special nature of banks’ corporate governance essentially entails that 
board directors should be held to a broader standard of care than other directors. 
4 Luckily, normality is identified using a Jarque-Bera test. If normality was not identified a three-stage 
least squares estimator would have been the consistent method. For a thorough discussion on the 
estimation of panel data models with endogenous regressors, see Bhargava (1991).   
5 Only large commercial banks are used so as to avoid potential criticism regarding differential 
technology structures between banks of different size or type. 
6 It would have been preferable to use the number of employees, instead of total assets, to construct the 
price of labor. However, the number of employees is not available for many banks in our sample (for a 
similar implementation, see e.g. Lensink et al., 2007). 
7 See OECD (2004). The EU Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC states, in generic terms, that 
a director should be considered to be independent only if he is free of any business, family or other 
relationship, with the company, its controlling shareholder or the management of either, that creates a 
conflict of interest such as to impair his judgment. Annex II of the Commission Recommendation 
identifies a number of situations reflecting the relationships or circumstances usually recognized as 
likely to generate material conflict of interest (e.g., not be an executive director or employee of the 
company or associated company, not be or represent a controlling shareholder, not have, or have had 
within the last year, a significant business relationship with the company or an associated company, not 
be, or have been within the last three years, partner or employee of the present or former external 
auditor of the company or an associated company, etc.). 
8 A better measure for credit risk is probably the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. However, 
provisions are readily manageable by banks and thus represent an element of choice for the financial 
institutions. Nevertheless we inquire into the robustness of the results by also using non-performing 
loans. 
9 Due to space considerations we do not report detailed efficiency results or results for the coefficients 
on inputs/outputs and interaction terms of Eqs. (2) and (4). However, these results are available on 
request. 
10 For expositional brevity we report results on efficiency (not inefficiency). 
11 This result remains unaffected in the rest of the equations presented in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
Therefore, it seems that the board size variables should be scaled by bank size, so as to avoid giving 
larger banks an unfair advantage. Most of the previous literature simply uses the logarithm of board 
members. 
12 Adams and Mehran (2003) offer a different explanation: due to regulatory requirements emphasizing 
the safety and soundness of banks and taking into account that bank supervisors share examination 
results with the boards of directors and may also perform on-site visits to poorly performing banks, 
board directors are inclined to direct their advisory role towards maintaining the safety and soundness 
of the institution rather than value maximization. 
13 On the advisory role of non-executive, independent directors see, inter alia, Daily and Schwenk 
(1996), Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), Lawler, Finegold, Benson and Conger (2002), Fich 
(2005). For the potential limitations of non-executive, independent directors’ advisory role see e.g., 
Adams and Mehran (2003), Song and Thakor (2006), Adams and Ferreira (2007). 
14 Note that the level of the board size variable remains negative and statistical significant throughout. 
15 We reserved the squared term in equation VI of Table 4, because the impact of the percentage of 
non-executives on profit efficiency was found to be inverted U-shaped (see Table 3 above). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics (2002-2006) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Kurtosis Skewness 
Board size 17.15 16.00 26.66 7.00 48.00 3.13 1.42 
Board composition 60.98 61.54 14.31 18.18 89.00 0.79 -0.57 
Equity/total assets 8.95 5.26 3.32 3.79 46.06 20.42 4.59 
LLP 45.35 4.97 5.91 0.85 81.91 49.39 15.61 
GDP per capita 17,729.2 18,478.21 11,561 8,148.9 28,742.9 -0.71 -0.11 
H-H index 581.83 482.00 259.74 163.00 2,730.00 5.51 2.19 
Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of 
GDP) 
117.65 111.76 129.41 61.09 185.15 -1.09 0.23 
Nominal interest 
rate 5.31 5.48 2.17 2.57 9.70 0.98 0.59 
Source: Annual reports of the credit institutions. 
Note: Board size: Number of directors of banks; Board composition: proportion of non-executives in the board 
of directors; LLP: loan loss provisions/total loans; H-H index: Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Figures are 
expressed in percentages for all variables (except of board size and GDP per capita) and in € for GDP per 
capita. 
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Table 2 
The effect of board structure on bank efficiency 
 Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
 I II III IV V VI 
Constant 3.20 (8.93)*** 
6.81 
(12.26)*** 
3.16 
(8.97)*** 
2.72 
(3.57)*** 
6.96 
(5.50)*** 
2.24 
(3.02)*** 
Trend 0.01 (0.25) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.08 
(2.52) 
0.06 
(1.98)** 
0.09 
(2.63)*** 
ln(equity/total assets) -0.30 (-8.02)*** 
-0.19 
(-4.98)*** 
-0.30 
(-7.90)*** 
0.52 
(6.77)*** 
0.66 
(8.18)*** 
0.48 
(6.35)*** 
ln(board size) -0.26 (-3.39)***   
-0.35 
(-2.25)**   
ln(board size/assets)  
-0.39 
(-8.34)***   
-0.44 
(-4.65)***  
ln(% non-executives)   
-0.20 
(-3.64)***   
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
GDP per capita 0.01 (4.41)*** 
0.01 
(3.92)*** 
0.01 
(4.75)*** 
0.01 
(2.02)** 
0.01 
(2.65)*** 
0.01 
(2.29)*** 
H-H index -0.01 (-3.77)*** 
-0.01 
(-3.65)*** 
-0.01 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
0.01 
(1.09) 
0.01 
(1.61) 
0.01 
(1.59) 
-0.01 
(-1.87)* 
-0.01 
(-1.81)* 
-0.01 
(-1.80)* 
Nominal interest rate 0.03 (1.60) 
0.04 
(2.52)** 
0.03 
(1.38) 
-0.19 
(-5.44)*** 
-0.18 
(-5.42)** 
-0.19 
(-5.69)*** 
Sigma-squared 0.36 0.31 0.35              1.18 1.12 1.24             
LR-test -146.33*** -119.32*** -145.45*** -262.97*** -255.33*** -265.41*** 
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The ***, **, and * indicate 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. LR-test: Likelihood ratio test that all parameters in the model are zero. 
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Table 3 
Non-linearity in the relationship between board structure and bank efficiency 
 Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
 I II III IV V VI 
Constant 4.89 (4.14)*** 
6.52 
(10.83)*** 
3.27 
(6.14)*** 
-0.77 
(-0.36) 
8.30 
(5.57)*** 
0.14 
(0.15) 
Trend 0.01 (0.44) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.08 
(2.32)** 
0.06 
(1.84)* 
0.08 
(2.54)** 
ln(equity/total assets) -0.30 (-7.98)*** 
-0.21 
(-5.25)*** 
-0.30 
(-7.88)*** 
0.51 
(6.75)*** 
0.68 
(8.56)*** 
0.49 
(6.60)*** 
ln(board size) -1.49 (-1.82)*   
2.24 
(1.48)   
ln(board size/assets)  
-0.52 
(-5.93)***   
-0.20 
(-1.13)  
ln(board size)^2 0.22 (1.50)   
-0.45 
(-1.72)*   
ln(board size/assets)^2  
-0.02 
(-1.74)*   
0.04 
(1.70)*  
ln(% non-executives)   
-0.29 
(-0.80)   
2.30 
(3.62)*** 
ln(% non-executives)^2   
0.02 
(0.26)   
-0.52 
(-3.69)*** 
GDP per capita 0.01 (4.48)*** 
0.01 
(3.78)*** 
0.01 
(4.72)*** 
0.01 
(2.19)** 
0.01 
(2.43)** 
0.01 
(2.88)*** 
H-H index -0.01 (-4.10)*** 
-0.01 
(-3.77)*** 
-0.01 
(-3.50)*** 
0.00 
(0.39) 
0.01 
(0.64) 
0.01 
(0.80) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
0.01 
(0.87) 
0.01 
(1.43) 
0.01 
(1.60) 
-0.01 
(-1.88)* 
-0.01 
(-1.53) 
-0.01 
(-1.99)** 
Nominal interest rate 0.03 (1.71)* 
0.04 
(2.43)** 
0.03 
(1.38) 
-0.19 
(-5.74)*** 
-0.17 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.20 
(-6.07)*** 
Sigma-squared 0.37 0.32 0.35              1.23 1.15 1.26            
LR-test -145.27*** -117.77*** -145.42*** -261.67*** -253.89*** -259.78*** 
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The ***, **, and * indicate 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. LR-test:  Likelihood ratio test that all parameters in the model are zero.  
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Table 4 
The interrelationship of board structure with credit risk 
 Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
 I II III IV V VI 
Constant 2.80 (7.67)*** 
6.68 
(12.09)*** 
2.79 
(7.82)*** 
2.80 
(3.54)*** 
7.05 
(5.51)*** 
0.14 
(0.15) 
Trend 0.01 (0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
0.08 
(2.48)** 
0.06 
(1.91)* 
0.08 
(2.50)** 
ln(equity/total assets) -0.32 (-8.83)*** 
-0.20 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.31 
(-8.73)*** 
0.53 
(6.75)*** 
0.66 
(8.19)*** 
0.50 
(6.61)*** 
ln(board size) -0.19 (-2.36)**   
-0.38 
(-2.17)**   
ln(board size/assets)  
-0.45 
(-8.63)***   
-0.42 
(-4.01)***  
LLP*ln(board size) 0.02 (3.25)***   
-0.01 
(-0.40)   
LLP*ln(board size/assets)  
-0.01 
(-2.44)**   
0.01 
(0.48)  
ln(% non-executives)   
-0.11 
(-1.85)*   
2.29 
(3.61)*** 
ln(% non-executives)^2      
-0.53 
(-3.74)*** 
LLP*ln(% non-executives)   
0.02 
(3.22)***   
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
GDP per capita 0.01 (4.35)*** 
0.01 
(3.53)*** 
0.01 
(4.82)*** 
0.01 
(1.83)* 
0.01 
(2.47)** 
0.01 
(2.64)*** 
H-H index -0.01 (-3.03)*** 
-0.01 
(-3.63)*** 
-0.01 
(-2.79)*** 
0.00 
(-0.06) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(0.78) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
0.01 
(1.24) 
0.00 
(1.70)* 
0.01 
(1.83)* 
-0.01 
(-1.86)* 
-0.01 
(-1.83)* 
-0.01 
(-1.98)** 
Nominal interest rate 0.03 (1.50) 
0.04 
(2.18)** 
0.02 
(1.29) 
-0.18 
(-5.34)*** 
-0.18 
(-5.40)*** 
-0.20 
(-6.07)*** 
Sigma-squared 0.38 0.29 0.37              1.18 1.12 1.26              
LR-test -141.56*** -116.44*** -140.82*** -262.89*** -255.22*** -259.64*** 
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The ***, **, and * indicate 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. LR-test: Likelihood ratio test that all parameters in the model are zero. 
 
 
 
